Philosophers and scientists alike have suggested Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), and other similar model selection methods, show predictive accuracy justifies a preference for simplicity in model selection. This epistemic justification of simplicity is limited by an assumption of AIC which requires that the same probability distribution must generate the data used to fit the model and the data about which predictions are made. This limitation has been previously noted but appears to often go unnoticed by philosophers and scientists and has not been analyzed in relation to complexity. If predictions are about future observations, we argue that this assumption is unlikely to hold for models of complex phenomena. That in turn creates a practical limitation for simplicity's AIC-based justification because scientists modeling such phenomena are often interested in predicting the future. We support our argument with an ecological case study concerning the reintroduction of wolves into Yellowstone National Park, U.S.A. We suggest that AIC might still lend epistemic support for simplicity by leading to better explanations of complex phenomena.
The epistemic value of simplicity in modeling
Philosophers and scientists have long valued simplicity, but the epistemic justification of this value has been intensely debated. Over the past two decades, one facet of the debate has focused on statistical model selection. In a 1994 article, Forster & Sober proposed that Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) provided such a justification by linking simpler models to increased predictive accuracy. Forster & Sober's proposal has been influential in the philosophical literature, 1 and their analysis has been extended to topics such as predictivism (Dowe, Gardner, & Oppy, 2007; Forster, 2002; Hitchcock & Sober, 2004; Lee, 2013; Sober, 2008) . The article has also enjoyed uptake in the scientific literature (e.g., Ginzburg & Jensen, 2004) and influential statistical texts (e.g., Burnham & Anderson, 2002) . The proposal has also been criticized on the grounds that AIC is not invariant under changes in how models are described or grouped into families (DeVito, 1997; Forster, 1995 Forster, , 1999b Kukla, 1995) . We raise a distinct and largely undiscussed concern that Forster and Sober's proposal is limited when modeling complex phenomena because complexity challenges an assumption required by AIC. Our argument has important implications because AIC is routinely used by modelers studying complex phenomena.
Forster & Sober note that although models can be formed and parameters estimated such that a model passes exactly through every data point, it is common practice to avoid this technique. This is because "scientists seem to be willing to sacrifice goodness-of-fit if there is a compensating gain in simplicity" (Forster & Sober, 1994, p. 5) . Techniques that maximize goodness-of-fit without considering simplicity (e.g., ordinary least squares regression) are sometimes insufficient, as we shall see in Section 2. Moreover, a vague or subjective notion of simplicity will undermine its epistemic justification. What is required is a criterion that trades-off fit with simplicity in an empirically justifiable fashion. Forster and Sober (1994) argue AIC does exactly this because it improves predictive accuracy by balancing models' simplicity and fit to the data. Drawing a link between AIC and predictive accuracy requires the assumption that the data used to fit the model and the data for which predictions are made are generated by the same probability distribution (Forster, 2000, p. 216) . Following Forster & Sober, we call this the "uniformity of nature" assumption (Forster & Sober, 1994, p. 29; Sober, 2002, p. S116) . 2 The uniformity of nature assumption means that Forster & Sober's philosophical justification of simplicity is limited to what Forster (2002) calls interpolative predictive accuracy, that is, predictive accuracy for the data to which a model was fit; it does not extend to extrapolative predictive accuracy. Although mentioned by Forster and Sober (1994) and discussed by Forster (2000 Forster ( , 2002 , this limitation appears to often go unnoticed by both philosophers and scientists. Clarifying AIC's relationship to extrapolative predictions is crucial because scientists typically understand predictions to be about the future and predictive accuracy in this sense is often cited as a goal of AIC (Aho, Derryberry, & Peterson, 2014; Shmueli, 2010) . In addition, neither AIC nor Forster & Sober's justification of simplicity have been philosophically analyzed in relation to modeling complex phenomena, which is surprising given that AIC is routinely used by modelers working in complex disciplines such as ecology. Here we use an ecological case study to show how complexity challenges the uniformity of nature assumption when model predictions are extrapolated. This case clarifies how AIC tends not to increase predictive accuracy as many scientists understand it. We offer the alternative idea that when AIC is applied to models of complex phenomena, it serves to improve explanations of past events rather than improve predictions of future ones. Our argument is relevant not only to ecology, where the use of AIC is pervasive (Burnham & Anderson, 2002) , 3 but also to similar disciplines that apply AIC such as sociology (Burnham & Anderson, 2004) and psychology (Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) . The organization of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we describe AIC and Forster & Sober's philosophical justification of simplicity. In Section 3, we use an ecological case study to demonstrate how complexity threatens the uniformity of nature assumption. In Section 4, we respond to potential objections to our argument. In Section 5, we explore the idea that AIC can lead to better explanations. We conclude our argument in Section 6.
AIC and the uniformity of nature assumption
Our discussion turns on the question: how should models be fit to data? Model fitting has two components. First, a model form must be chosen. The linear model represents the 'base' or simplest model form 4 :
where y is some response variable, x is some predictor variable, a is the slope, b is the y-intercept, and ε is an error term. Models with higher-level polynomials (e.g., add x 2 to Eq. (1)) or additional predictors (x 1 , x 2 , etc.) are considered more complex than the linear model. The choice among competing models is termed model selection. Second, values of a given model's parameters must be estimated. For example, a and b in Eq.
(1) must be somehow optimized because there are infinitely many straight lines that could be fit to the data. The process of parameter estimation seeks those values that make a given model's predictions most closely match the data. A simple approach is ordinary least squares, which minimizes the squared difference between model predictions and the data. The maximum likelihood method of parameter estimation is a generalization of this approach (Burnham & Anderson, 2002) and differs in that, instead of squared differences, a likelihood function is used to relate the model to data.
5 Forster and Sober (1994) note that the naïve empiricist should unequivocally select a more complex model because it will always minimize the error between the model and the data. To choose a simpler model that fits the data less well as a mere matter of taste (cf. Kuhn, 1957, p. 181) would be foolhardy from an empiricist perspective. The empiricist could prefer the simpler model only if it provided an epistemic advantage, such as increased predictive accuracy.
Forster & Sober use the concepts of signal and noise to explain how a simpler model might make better predictions. The signal is the true process generating the data and the noise is the observational error in the data collection process. If we perfectly fit a complex model to the data, we conflate the signal with the noise and thereby decrease predictive accuracy due to Type I errors (i.e., finding spurious relationships among variables; Freedman, 1983 ). Forster & Sober provide an example to support their claim. Suppose Fig. 1 . A linear process generates the data (the true model is y ¼ 1.6x þ 6), but observed data include error (normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 3). Two models are fit using ordinary least squares: top, a linear function, and bottom, a fourth-order polynomial function. The polynomial fits the data better (as indicated by the R 2 statistic), but will be a poorer predictor of future data from the (true) linear process.
2 The label "uniformity of nature" is potentially misleading. In the present context, it only refers to the existence of a single probability density function that generates data throughout the time period of concern. It is not a claim about the existence of stable, universal physical laws. 3 This authoritative reference on AIC has 33,413 citations on Google Scholar as of August 16, 2016. 4 In applied sciences, the term 'linear model' can refer to models for which the response variable is predicted as a function of predictor variables with additive effects. In Eq.
(1), a 'linear model' means a straight line.
5 Bolker (2008) describes this as finding the parameter values that, given the model, make the data the "most likely to have happened" (p. 170), but it's important to emphasize that a likelihood function considers the data fixed and the parameters variable, not the other way around.
we fit two models via ordinary least squares to data produced by a linear process, one using a linear function and another using a higher-order polynomial. The latter will always fit the data better (e.g., as measured by a larger R 2 statistic or a smaller sum-ofsquares) but will predict future data less accurately because it is overfit (Fig. 1) . AIC limits overfitting by applying a penalty of 2k to each model, where k is the number of model parameters. 6 The top curve in Fig. 1 would have three parameters (intercept, coefficient on the x variable, and an error term 7 ) and receive a penalty of six, whereas the bottom curve would have seven parameters (intercept, one for each x variable, and the error term) and receive a penalty of 14.
8 If the complex model is to be preferred, it must overcome this eight-point penalty compared to the simpler model by having a substantially higher likelihood (in our example AIC chooses the linear model).
In the above example, one of the models under consideration contained the true curve, but it is typically the case that no model is literally true (cf. Box, 1976, p. 792 ) and all involve idealizations (Forster, 2000, p. 212; Weisberg, 2007 ). Yet as Sober observes, "if all the hypotheses under test are known to be false (since all contain idealizations), it may still be worthwhile to determine which of them can be expected to make the most accurate predictions" (2008, p. 81; cf. Sober, 2002) . Thus, Forster & Sober suggest that the rationale for AIC be understood in terms of predictive accuracy (1994, pp. 10e11, 27) . They define predictive accuracy as the average log-likelihood of a model per datum with respect to data newly generated from the true curve 9 (p. 10, see footnote 15). The use of AIC is then justified on the grounds of Akaike's theorem (p. 9e 10), which asserts that AIC is an unbiased estimator of predictive accuracy under certain conditions. 10 Of these conditions, we will only be concerned here with one that Forster & Sober call the "uniformity of nature" assumption (p. 29). Roughly, the uniformity of nature assumption asserts that the same probability distribution generates both the data used to fit the model (the "calibration" data set) and the data about which one wishes to make predictions (the "prediction" data set). Forster & Sober state this assumption as, "the true curve, whatever it is, remains the same for both the old and the new data sets considered in the definition of predictive accuracy" (1994, p. 29) . Consider the example given in Fig. 1 , wherein the true model is y ¼ 1.6x þ 6 and the error term is normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 3. The uniformity of nature assumption entails that old and new data are generated from this same model and error distribution. In other words, the assumption is that probability density function of Y conditional on X ¼ x remains constant.
In a different place, Sober (2002) gives a stronger formulation of the uniformity of nature assumption:
the new data will be drawn from the same underlying reality that generated the old (this has two partsdthat the true function that connects independent to dependent variables is the same across data sets, and that the distribution that determines how the values of independent variables are selected is also the same). (p. S216) This statement of the uniformity of nature assumption strengthens the previous definition by requiring that the probability density of X itself remain constant. For example, in the case of a joint probability density function with continuous random variables, f X,Y (x,y) ¼ f YjX (yjx)f X (x), the conditional distribution, f YjX (yjx), and the marginal distribution of X, f X (x), must be stationary. We focus on the first and weaker of the two formulations of the uniformity of nature assumption, according to which the probability of the outcome conditional on the predictors remains constant.
Other model selection approaches also rely on an assumption of this sort. As Forster (2000) notes, "[m]odel selection criteria are standardly designed to maximize the fit with the data that are resampled from the same generating distribution" (p. 208, cf. Beven & Smith, 2014) . Given that many model selection criteria employ a likelihood function that entails some form the uniformity of nature assumption (see Section 4), our analysis applies to model selection approaches beyond AIC. 11 We use AIC as representative of such criteria because it is basis of Forster & Sober's proposal and the most widely applied criterion.
A simple example will illustrate how the weaker form of the uniformity of nature assumption can fail. Suppose a model links rising ambient temperatures to increased metabolic costs (e.g., breathing rate) in some animal (e.g., in moose; Renecker & Hudson, 1986) , but the animal's response is contingent upon another variable, say, exposure to sunlight. The relationship only manifests when animals are in direct sunlight and disappears in the shade. Suppose a model is fit using data collected from animals exposed to direct sunlight. Given that condition, the model would predict the metabolic response well. But if the model were applied to animals in shaded areas, predictions would be poor. This simple scenario demonstrates how the conditional probability distribution of the outcome variable (breathing rate) on the predictor variable (temperature) that generated the prediction data set (response in shade) is distinct from that to which the model was fit (response in sunlight). The uniformity of nature assumption does not hold and AIC's ability to improve predictive accuracy is compromised.
The degree to which such contingencies are a problem for the uniformity of nature assumption depends on how likely they occur in the system under study and how difficult they are to detect when present. Such contingencies can usually be remediated for simple phenomena by searching for and discovering hidden variables, or relationships among them. As phenomena become more complex, these contingencies become more problematic in two ways. First, the chance of encountering them increases due to ontological complexity, where a phenomenon or system is comprised of distinct but interactive components which themselves exhibit system-like properties (Emmeche, 1997) . Second, the ability to precisely identify such contingencies decreases due to descriptive complexity, where the definition of a phenomenon or system changes with its context and scale (Emmeche, 1997) . We discuss how these characteristics challenge the uniformity of nature assumption in the following section.
6 AIC uses maximum likelihood estimation procedures to fit models to data, of which ordinary least squares is a particular case (see Appendix B in Forster and Sober (1994) ).
7 A term common to every model in a set (e.g., the variance of an error term in simple regression) can be omitted as a penalty term without affecting inference via AIC because all models are penalized equally. 8 Lower AIC scores are better, thus the penalty is positive. 9 Forster and Sober (1994) use the term "true curve" to refer to a particular statistical model that generated the observed data, e.g., y ¼ 1.6x þ 6 þ ε as in Fig. 1 example. 10 An unbiased estimator is one whose expected value is equal to the value it seeks to estimate. See Appendix A of Forster and Sober (1994) for a discussion of the conditions underlying this theorem and Appendix B for a proof of the theorem in a special case.
Complex phenomena and non-uniformity: an ecological case study
Complex phenomena tend to possess the following four properties (Mitchell, 2009; Peterson, Vucetich, Bump, & Smith, 2014): 1. A large number of predictor variables for each response variable, and not all relevant variables are known or measured (Burnham & Anderson, 2002) . 2. Variables of interest are hierarchically structured (Allen & Starr, 1982) . 3. Variables interact with one another (i.e., the relationship between predictor variables and the response varies depending on the values of other variables). 4. Variables exhibit non-stationary distributions, with anticipated variation across time, creating an environment in which emergent properties appear (Emmeche, 1997) .
It may be helpful to distinguish complex phenomena from complicated ones. Both have many related "moving parts", but for complicated phenomena these parts tend to be deterministic, distinct, and separately controllable, while for complex phenomena, they are dynamic, stochastic, and poorly defined. Airplane operation is complicated; the population dynamics of interacting biological communities is complex (Van de Vijver, Van Speybroeck, & Vendevyvere, 2003) .
Properties 1 and 4 of complex phenomena call the uniformity of nature assumption into question. Given 1, many predictor variables are unmeasured, and given 4, the distribution of these unmeasured variables may change, entailing that the probability distribution generating the data is not constant across time. Items 2 and 3 on the list make matters worse. As a consequence of interaction effects, many of which are hierarchically structured, changes in the distribution of unmeasured variables may also alter the relationship between the measured predictor variables and the response. These themes are explored below by describing ecological research on wolf reintroduction in Yellowstone National Park (YNP).
Gray wolves (Canis lupus) were reintroduced into YNP in the northwestern United States in the winter of 1995e1996 following an absence of approximately 70 years. These wolves expanded throughout the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem and now a population of w100 individuals divided among roughly 10 packs resides within YNP boundaries. A cornerstone of ecological inquiry associated with the reintroduction lies in understanding the "topdown" effects of wolves on the herbivores and vegetation of YNP.
Wolves hunt elk (Cervus elaphus), which are herbivores that feed on vegetation in the park, including aspen and willow trees. From a top-down perspective, wolves directly influence elk, and elk in turn alter the spatial distribution, structure, and growth of the vegetation. The effect of wolves on vegetation mediated via elk is referred to as a trophic cascade. A central characteristic of trophic cascades is that predators affect prey foraging patterns through both lethal (i.e., direct predation) and non-lethal mechanisms. The latter arise because prey animals avoid predation, but they do so at a cost. For example, increased elk vigilance results in improved wolf detection, but it also means they spend less time feeding. A central question ecologists have sought to answer in YNP is: to what degree has wolf reintroduction led to a trophic cascade and "restored" natural vegetation communities that were disrupted by elk overfeeding when wolves were extirpated in the early 20th century?
We begin by examining elk population size or abundance in YNP. Eight subpopulations of elk currently reside in YNP with a total abundance estimate of 20,000 to 25,000 individuals (White & Garrott, 2013) . Between 1995 and 2006, the density of elk in the "Northern Range" area of the park decreased by 60%, coinciding with colonizing wolves' rapid population growth (Ripple & Beschta, 2012) . Given that 90% of YNP wolves' diet is elk (Metz, Smith, Vucetich, Stahler, & Peterson, 2012) , it is natural to infer that wolves contributed to the decline. Indeed, models developed both prior to and following the wolf reintroduction suggested wolf predation reduced elk abundance (e.g., Varley & Boyce, 2006; Varley & Brewster, 1992) . Others have proposed wolf predation negligibly affected elk abundance. Analyzing pre-and post-wolf reintroduction data, Vucetich, Smith, Stahler, and Ranta (2005) concluded that, rather than wolves, a combination of climatic factors (i.e., temperature, snowfall, and precipitation) and hunting outside park boundaries were predominantly responsible for elk abundance decline.
A closer look at these studies' models will provide context for discussing the uniformity of nature assumption. Vucetich et al. took two approaches to modeling wolf predation effects on elk abundance. First, they fit several models, including one with the form:
where r t is the annual growth rate in elk abundance for year t, N t is pre-hunting elk abundance in year t (included to account for density dependence), S t is cumulative snowfall in year t, P t is annual precipitation in year t, and LH t is the harvest rate of elk during the late hunting season, and ε is an error term assumed to be i.i.d. With a mean of zero. Vucetich et al. fit this model and simpler, nested versions of it to elk abundance data prior to wolf reintroduction. They then used the coefficients from the best of these models (determined by AIC) 12 to predict elk abundance in years following wolf reintroduction. Finally, they regressed a wolf predation variable (W t ) against the residuals of the extrapolated predictions to test whether a pattern in residual error could be partially explained by wolf predation. The variable W t represented the number of wolfkilled elk in year t and was calculated by extrapolating wolf predation rates observed from two wolf packs in the Northern Range to all packs in the same area, assuming that predation rates observed from November to February represented rates throughout the winter and that summer predation rates were 70% of winter rates. They found that the slope of W t did not significantly differ from zero and concluded wolf predation added no explanatory power to the climate and hunting models. In a second approach, they compared two models of elk abundance, one with wolf predation as a predictor variable and one without. The model excluding wolves had a better AIC score, further supporting their conclusions. In comparison, N. Varley and Boyce's (2006) model contained a similar response variable (elk abundance), but was more complex. Their model estimated survival parameters separately for each of five elk classes: calf, yearling male, cow, old-cow, and bull. In addition, the term representing wolf predation on elk took the form of a functional response, which assumes that as prey density increases, the rate of prey consumed asymptotes because even if prey availability rises continuously, prey handling time (eating and digesting prey items) remains constant and limits predation rate at high prey densities. The functional response took the form:
where F i is the functional response (prey killed/wolf/year) for the ith prey available, A i is the attack rate of wolves on the ith prey, N i is the number of individuals of the ith prey, P N j is the sum of all 12 Vucetich et al. used a version of AIC corrected for small sample sizes (AIC c ) that also entails the uniformity of nature assumption.
available prey (elk, moose, bison, and deer), and T hi is the handling time for the ith prey. The number of wolves in the YNP population was then multiplied by F i to estimate the number of elk killed by wolves annually. In contrast to Vucetich et al., this model suggested that wolf predation decreased the Northern Range elk population up to 21% in long-term simulations. We now revisit the properties of complex systems outlined above and show how their presence in the study system challenges the uniformity of nature assumption. First, variables that likely affect the response variable are omitted from models. For example, the models above lacked variables for grizzly bear (Ursus arctos) or black bear (Ursus americanus) predation.
13 Given that bears can account for up to two-thirds of elk calf mortality, and that bear abundance increased following wolf reintroduction (Barber-Meyer, Mech, & White, 2008), it's plausible that models without bear predation variables have non-static error terms. Others (e.g., Christianson & Creel, 2014) have proposed that rather than via direct predation, wolves reduce elk abundance by inducing antipredator behavioral and physiological changes in elk, including increased vigilance and stress levels which in turn depress reproduction and survival. These non-lethal "risk effects" of wolves on elk can be considerable; Creel, Christianson, & Winnie (2011) show that pregnancy rates in 10 populations of elk in and around YNP decreased 24e43% due to increased wolf predation risk. Given that predation risk is spatiotemporally variable and depends on a host of factors such as wolf population size and behavior, it is likely that models omitting risk effects would violate the uniformity of nature assumption when predicting future events. Second, omitted variables can interact with measured ones, creating emergent, systems-level effects over time. For example, in winter elk might exploit vegetative structure to reduce wolf predation risk by forming larger groups in more open habitat, thereby increasing their ability to detect wolves and diluting predation risk per capita (Mao et al., 2005) . If vegetation structure is unmeasured, then changes in this variable might alter the relationship between the wolf population and elk abundance in ways that the model cannot capture. Such changes could occur quickly and unexpectedly. For example, a wildfire, such as the one that affected over 2,500 km 2 (>25%) of YNP in 1988 (Turner, Romme, & Tinker, 2003) , could rapidly alter the landscape. Yet other research groups studying elk and wolves in YNP have emphasized the effects of winter snow depth on elk survival. Wolf kill-rates tend to increase in deep snow because elk cannot effectively escape attacks (Becker, Garrott, White, Gower, Bergman, & Jaffe, 2008) and, as snow depth increases, more elk move to lower elevations outside the park where they are vulnerable to hunting (White & Garrott, 2005) . These studies suggest variables interact and effects emerge over time, once more presenting challenges for extrapolated model predictions in cases where such variables are not considered. This discussion highlights the difficulty of identifying and including all relevant variables in the system and properly accounting for their interactions. The system displays ontological complexity, where complex components interact in a larger environment of complexity. In this context there are good grounds for thinking that models from any given study likely have nonstationary error terms (Emmeche, 1997) , which in turn suggests AIC's uniformity of nature assumption will not apply if the data in the prediction set are from a later time period than the calibration set.
At this point, one could insist that all conceivably relevant variables should be measured and included in the model. Aside from the enormous practical difficulties of data collection and model convergence, there is a conceptual reason why such efforts might fail. To illustrate this point, consider the trophic cascade. The risk of predation alters elk behavior, including their decisions about where to go, what to eat, and how much to eat. This has led some researchers argue that the mere presence of wolves creates a "landscape of fear" for elk, the effect of which cascades through the trophic levels and "releases" the vegetation from elk overfeeding (Laundré, Hernández, & Altendorf, 2001; Ripple & Beschta, 2003) .
A challenge in describing the landscape of fear is adequately defining and measuring "predation risk." Researchers working in YNP vary widely in their approach: Laundré et al. (2001) loosely defined wolf-occupied areas as high risk and wolf-free areas as no risk; Ripple and Beschta (2003) characterized more open habitat as less risky due to the increased ability of elk to detect approaching wolves; Creel, Winnie, Maxwell, Hamlin, and Creel (2005) defined risky areas as those in which wolves were present in a given day; Creel, Christianson, Liley, and Winnie (2007) indexed predation risk using a density ratio of wolves-to-elk in a given area; Middleton et al. (2013) measured the distance between GPS-collared elk and the nearest GPS-collared wolf at a given time. More examples abound, but the point is clear: predation risk, despite crucially contributing to the landscape of fear and trophic cascades in YNP, is multi-faceted and spatiotemporally variable, lending itself to numerous justifiable idealizations for modeling. Thus, in addition to ontological complexity, the system also exhibits descriptive complexity (Emmeche, 1997) .
Descriptive complexity accentuates the problem of unmeasured relevant variables. Not only are there too many variables to measure, there are also too many ways to measure the variables that are considered. No single approach to measuring "predation risk" is the best across the board. Choosing one idealization of "predation risk" makes it likely that some potentially significant aspects will be omitted. In such circumstances researchers often settle on a definition that, in a given context, seem to capture the most important factors. This challenges the uniformity of nature assumption because in complex settings, interacting systems-within-systems cause latent variables like predation risk to emerge, disappear, or take on new definitions.
Our discussion only touches on the complexity present in the YNP trophic cascade. There are numerous other issues, including adequately measuring vegetation response (e.g., see the debate on quantifying plant height between Kauffman, Brodie, & Jules, 2010 and Ripple, 2013) , the effects of non-elk herbivores on vegetative structure (e.g., bison, moose, white-tailed deer, mule deer, beavers, and others; see P J White & Garrott, 2013) , and hydrological conditions that mitigate wolf influence on vegetation (Marshall, Hobbs, & Cooper, 2013) . This case study demonstrates that not only can there be dozens of predictor variables relevant to an ecological question, it can also be unclear which are most important, if and how they interact to produce multiplied effects, how their spatiotemporal variation relates to the response variable, and how one ought to define and measure them. For complex phenomena, both the predictor variables that are important for a given response and the aspects of those predictors that are most important in a given context are likely to change over time. That in turn creates challenges for the assumption of a stable relationship between the outcome and measured predictor variables.
In addition to the conceptual argument above, there are straightforwardly empirical reasons to question whether AIC is a guide for predictive accuracy in ecology. For example, Baker (2004) exploited a situation in which an animal population had a known minimum abundance. He modeled the population assuming 13 Varley & Boyce (2006) note, "Predation by . black bears (Ursus americanus) and grizzly bears (Ursus arctos), while probably significant to prey populations, were assumed to be intrinsic to the underlying population dynamics" (p. 321).
ignorance of the true abundance and compared models' predictive ability. In some cases models that scored 10 to 24 AIC units worse than the top model produced near-identical predictions to those of the top model (p. 993). Given that a model with an AIC score of more than 10 units worse than the top model has virtually no empirical support (Burnham & Anderson, 2004) , it is striking that such divergent models can yield such similar predictions. Interestingly, in this example all of the models substantially underestimated the true population size, perhaps indicating that they failed to capture the relevant variables in their appropriate form.
Our discussion above implies the uniformity of nature assumption is problematic when models of complex phenomena, such as those constructed by ecologists, predict future observations. We suggest that Forster and Sober's (1994) AIC-based justification of simplicity is limited in these contexts. We consider how Forster & Sober might respond to this challenge in the following section.
Objections, replies, and two types of prediction
The challenge complexity presents for the uniformity of nature assumption is rarely discussed explicitly in the literature. As far as we know, the only place in which Forster connects AIC to the study of complex phenomena is in an article (Forster, 1999a) titled, "How do Simple Rules 'Fit to Reality' in a Complex World?" In this article, Forster does not explore difficulties for the uniformity of nature assumption raised by complexity. He refers to the uniformity of nature assumption as a "weak" assumption (p. 560), which appears to imply that it is easily satisfied. In addition, he suggests that AIC provides a basis for understanding how simple rules, or "fast and frugal heuristics," can contribute to predictive accuracy in complex circumstances (p. 560e561). For his part, Sober gives examples from ecology (Sober, 2002; pp. S217eS218) and educational research (Sober, 2015, pp. 135e137 ) to illustrate AIC without discussing complexity.
Nevertheless, Forster & Sober are aware that the uniformity of nature assumption is fallible and that when it fails AIC may not be a good indicator of predictive accuracy (cf. Sober, 2002 ; pp. S116e S117). Consider, for instance, this passage from Forster:
If we think of model selection as using data sampled from one distribution in order to predict data sampled from another, then it is clear that all the methods listed above [which include AIC] assume that the two distributions are the same. Yet in practice, predictions are sampled from a distribution that is an extension of the data generating distribution. This is most obvious in the case of time series models, where the goal is (usually) to extrapolate or generalize beyond the range of the observed data, but it also arises more generally. In such cases, errors of estimation arise not only from small sample fluctuations, but also from the failure of the sampled data to properly represent the domain of prediction. (Forster, 2000, p. 216, p. 216) The mention of time series models is especially relevant, as most ecological data are time series. However, the above quotation raises a question: if AIC is of limited use for prediction, then how does it show that predictive accuracy provides a justification for simplicity?
In a subsequent article, Forster clarifies the issue by drawing a distinction between "interpolative" and "extrapolative" predictive accuracy:
Interpolative predictive accuracy is defined roughly as predictive accuracy within the same domain of prediction as that from which the observed data were sampled. Extrapolative predictive accuracy is predictive accuracy in a domain outside of the interpolative domain (the interesting case being when it is entirely outside). (Forster, 2002, p. S126; cf.; Sober, 2015, p. 133, p. 133) Forster defines the term "domain of prediction as a probability distribution over values of the variable x" (ibid). We take this to mean that interpolative predictive accuracy is the case in which the calibration and prediction data sets are generated from the same probability distribution (i.e., "interpolative predictive accuracy" is predictive accuracy given that the uniformity of nature assumption holds). Forster, then, asserts that AIC achieves interpolative predictive accuracy, rather than extrapolative predictive accuracy (2002, p. S126-127). Forster concludes:
While AIC is a good means to achieving the goal of interpolative predictive accuracy, Akaike's real legacy is his general framework, for it requires us to make careful distinctions. It is only by carefully defining predictive accuracy that one notes the distinction between interpolative and extrapolative predictive accuracy, and only then does one think of asking whether they are achieved by the same methods or by different methods. The limitation of AIC to interpolation is a small setback for AIC and a major leap forward for the Akaike framework. (2002, p. S133eS134) Thus, Forster & Sober might respond that the limitation of their justification of simplicity illustrated in Section 3 is not a very serious concern, since AIC, properly understood, is a framework for thinking about statistical inference rather than a means for generating accurate predictions of the future.
However, such an assessment of AIC and its relation to predictive accuracy leaves simplicity's role as an epistemic value in model selection unresolved. How serious a problem the restriction to interpolative predictive accuracy is depends on how frequently scientists make forecasts within the same domain of prediction as calibration data (cf. Lee, 2013) . If in practice predictions are generally in the extrapolative rather than interpolative domain, then interpolative predictive accuracy would be limited as an epistemic justification of simplicity. Indeed, discussions of AIC and other model selection criteria in statistics and ecology often emphasize predictions about future observations, which typically fall into the extrapolative domain. In her review contrasting explanatory and predictive modeling, Shmueli (2010) defines predictive modeling as "the process of applying a statistical model or data mining algorithm to data for the purpose of predicting new or future observations" (p. 291). She goes on to state the goal of AIC is "to predict future data as accurately as possible" (p.300). Aho et al. (2014) discuss AIC as a means to determine "which model has the best predictive accuracy, in particular, which model is expected to fit future observations well" (p. 631). Gelman, Hwang, and Vehtari (2014) distinguish between within-and out-of-sample predictions, but do not mention the uniformity of nature assumption and appear to compare various selection criteria assuming it holds for out-of-sample predictions.
In all these cases, no consideration is given to the difference between interpolative and extrapolative accuracy. This is perhaps because when researchers generally conceptualize prediction, they are often thinking of extrapolation because it is a more desirable goal than interpolation (cf. Lee, 2013) . If that is correct, then a justification of simplicity limited to interpolative predictive accuracy does not correspond to the way most scientists think of prediction. This apparent mismatch might arise in part because scientists have not adequately appreciated that AIC only improves predictive accuracy when the uniformity of nature assumption holds and it part due to the lack of discussion in the literature of the potential of complexity to undermine the uniformity of nature assumption.
Confusion about AIC's limitations is no blow to the logic of Forster & Sober's argument. 14 It rather constrains its application to certain types of scientific endeavors, specifically those where interpolative predictive accuracy might have high value. This might occur in situations where interpolative predictive accuracy is expected to correlate with its extrapolative counterpart. This could be the case for simple phenomena operating at broad scales, i.e., those that entail a few variables that tend to be correlated in a general and stable way. An example from ecology is the species-area curve, which describes how the number of species increases as a power function of area. This correlation holds in many circumstances and appears robust as a general ecological rule. Due to this broadly stable relationship, a particular species-area model chosen from among many by AIC might be expected to be predictively accurate both in interpolation and extrapolation. In contrast, Section 3 suggests that stable correlations between a few predictor variables are rare for many complex phenomena, so we would not expect interpolative and extrapolative predictive accuracy to be closely related. If that is true, then AIC provides a stronger epistemic justification for simplicity when modeling simple phenomena than it does when modeling complex ones.
Another likely response to our argument is that the uniformity of nature assumption is common to many model selection approaches and therefore limits model selection in general rather than AIC in particular (cf. Forster, 2000) . As noted in Section 1, model selection approaches that employ likelihood functions typically entail some form of the uniformity of nature assumption.
Beven and Smith expound,
The likelihood function is based on expressing how well a hypothesis . can reproduce some observations. It is generally based on a sample of residual differences between the model predictions and the observations. A formal likelihood function can include some parametric structure in representing the residuals (bias or simple trend, simple autocorrelation structures, or simple structured heteroscedasticity) but fundamentally assumes that the residual series is aleatory with stationary properties. This allows the likelihood to have a formal probabilistic interpretation. (2014, p. A4014010-6) Note that assuming aleatory, stationary residuals is equivalent to the (weak) uniformity of nature assumption because it requires the probability density function of Y conditional on X ¼ x to remain static. Therefore, while we've focused on the limits of AIC due to its popular use as a selection criterion for models describing complex systems, we agree that our analysis extends to other criteria, such as the likelihood ratio test and BIC (see Murtaugh, 2014; Sober, 2015, p. 142) .
Finally, Forster & Sober might agree that we have identified a limitation of their justification of simplicity, but nevertheless insist that this does not undermine the adequacy of their explanation in the contexts in which it is applicable. That is true. Our argument, after all, does not claim that Forster & Sober's account of simplicity has no merit, only that it is limited with respect to complex phenomena. In the following section, we explore how AIC might lead to better explanations of complex systems rather than improved accuracy of future predictions. 15 
Explanation and interpolative predictive accuracy
The case study might raise the question: are ecosystems so complex that models of them are of little use, regardless of model selection technique? Although oftentimes theoretical models fail to align with empirical outcomes of ecological phenomena (e.g., see Sagoff, 2015) , we think not. One reason for this is that predicting the future is not the only possible aim of modeling. Explanation is another (cf. Odenbaugh, 2005) . Two cases illustrate how AIC might inadvertently improve explanation by achieving interpolative predictive accuracy: 1) explanatory models of complex systems that involve models-within-models, and 2) testing non-nested models that represent alternative explanatory hypotheses.
Recall that interpolative predictive accuracy is limited to cases in which the calibration and predictive data sets are generated from the same probability distribution. As the discussion in Section 3 illustrates, this is condition is unlikely to hold for models of complex phenomena if the predictive data set consists of future observations. In such circumstances, interpolative predictive accuracy is restricted to cases involving resampling from the calibration data set. The use of models-within-models suggests that such resampling can play an important role in explanation. The general pattern is the following. Some variable of interest (e.g., elk foraging behavior) is explained in part by another variable (e.g., predation risk) that represents a complex concept rather than some straightforwardly measurable quantity and the explanatory variable is itself modeled as a function of other variables. The output of that model, in turn, serves as an input to broader model seeking to explain the outcome. The key point for the present purposes is that both of these two models are calibrated to the same data set, and consequently the same probability distribution has generated the data in the two cases.
Such models-within-models are in fact common in ecology. For instance, the functional response of wolves used by N. Varley and Boyce (2006) as an input in their elk abundance model (Eq. (3)) is a relatively complex ecological model in its own right. Given that complex systems are usually hierarchical, the models that represent them often take the form of models-within-models, where a researcher has a particular interest in one component, or level, of a phenomenon. For example, recent ecological research has focused on the influence of global climate change on animal distribution and behavior. To assess such effects, one often needs a model that predicts temperatures over broad scales. These can be created by combining temperature data at discrete points (e.g., weather stations) with environmental data (e.g., elevation) to develop interpolative temperature surfaces via methods such multiple regression (Ninyerola, Pons, & Roure, 2000) . The ecologist then uses the output of this model as the input for another model that seeks to explain some aspect of animal distribution or behavior (e.g., how high summer temperatures cause heat-sensitive moose (Alces alces) to move to cooler habitats; Melin et al., 2014) . Interpolative predictive accuracy is all that is desired from the temperature model and in such a case, and AIC or other complexity-penalizing model criteria could help select the best such model. Second, model selection information criteria might be useful in a hypothesis-testing sense when they are used to evaluate nonnested models that represent competing explanatory hypotheses.
Criteria like AIC do not require nested models, which is an advantage over traditional hypothesis testing frameworks such likelihood ratio tests (cf. Burnham & Anderson, 2002; Sober, 2015) . Throughout their influential text on applied modeling using AIC, Burnham and Anderson, influenced by Chamberlin (1965) "multiple working hypotheses" approach to science, stress that a primary strength of information-theoretic model selection tools is their ability to compare non-nested hypotheses. Lytle (2002) provides an example of the approach. He tested the hypothesis that regular, severe disturbance events can drive evolutionary life-history strategies to maximize fitness. He built models that tested whether the adult body size of desert stream insects varied as a function of flash flooding. Such insects (in this case, the caddisfly Phylloicus aeneus) emerge following a juvenile stage devoted to body growth. Lytle hypothesized that P. aeneus would hedge body size against the probability of a flash flood due to the negligible chance of juveniles surviving such an event. He therefore expected larger juveniles to emerge earlier because once they achieved some minimal body size threshold sufficient for adult activities (e.g., reproduction), a further delay in emergence would risk near-certain mortality (i.e., due a flood). In addition, Lytle expected smaller juveniles to devote as much time as possible to growing larger, but at some point emerge despite a suboptimal body size due to the accumulating likelihood of flood mortality.
Several non-nested models were fitted to the data, which included size-at-adult-emergence and mean flood dates based on long-term (i.e., 100-year) rainfall data. The best models, as determined by AIC, suggested that first/last dates were more important for the evolutionary strategy than mean flood dates. Lytle concluded that small juveniles were indeed bet-hedging against floods and that some very small juveniles were forced to take the risky strategy of waiting until the end of flood season to emerge.
These examples suggest that if the aim is explaining the past rather than predicting the future, then concerns about the uniformity of nature assumption are less acute. This logic applies to studies in the YNP wolf example that primarily sought explanations of past events (e.g., did wolf predation cause a decline in elk, or something else?) rather than predictions of future ecosystem states (e.g., what will the elk population size be in 5 years?). In these cases, AIC might help find explanations of systems without reaching spurious conclusions e that is, avoiding Type I errors brought on by overfitting the data (cf. Anderson, Burnham, Gould, & Cherry, 2001) . Scientists have traditionally used standard hypothesis testing and associated P-values to limit such errors. AIC compliments this approach by comparing how well the data support models that represent discrete, non-nested explanatory hypotheses. Choosing a best model among many and identifying which models in a particular set are especially bad might also serve to heuristically improve forward-looking inference by illuminating causal relations or mechanistic underpinnings of complex phenomena. 16 While there are applications of AIC that explicitly aim to minimize predictive error (e.g., Baker, 2004) , it appears that, in complex systems, the interpolative predictive accuracy achieved under the uniformity of nature assumption is often a means to an explanatory end.
Conclusion
A major goal of Forster and Sober's (1994) paper was to "demythologize" simplicity by showing it had empirical value (Forster, 1995, p. 349) . They carried their claim with AIC, which, by penalizing model complexity, guards against overfitting a model to a given dataset and links simplicity with improved interpolative predictive accuracy. This is an important contribution to the philosophy of science because, when its assumptions are met, AIC does in fact give epistemic grounds for preferring simpler models. In such cases, simplicity loses its shadowy metaphysical undertones and becomes an epistemic value. However, when modeling complexity, likelihood-based model selection criteria in general face a limitation imposed by the uniformity of nature assumption: namely, such criteria tend to not improve prediction of future data in such contexts. We suggest that the epistemic value of AIC and similar model selection techniques with respect to complex phenomena might be better characterized in terms of explanatory adequacy rather than predictive accuracy.
